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Downside financial risk is misunderstood
Philip W. S. Newall∗
Abstract
The mathematics of downside financial risk can be difficult to understand: For example a 50% loss requires a subsequent
100% gain to break-even. A given percentage loss always requires a greater percentage gain to break-even. Instead, many
non-expert investors may assume for example that a 50% gain is sufficient to offset a 50% loss. Over 3,498 participants and
five experiments, the widespread illusion that a sequence of equal percentage gains and losses produces a zero overall return
was demonstrated. Participants continued to err frequently, even with percentage returns of +/-100%, or when financially in-
centivized. Financial literacy, numeracy, and deliberation were all shown to independently contribute to accurate performance.
These results have implications for promoting the understanding of downside financial risk.
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1 Introduction
“Stocks plunge 508 points, a drop of 22.6%”, was how
the New York Times reported the fall in the Dow Jones
Industrial Average on Black Monday, the record one-day
stock market crash on October 19th 1987. Financial returns
are usually reported as percentages, in order to standard-
ize price changes across different markets, investments, and
investors. An unusual feature of percentage returns is that
a subsequent 29.2% increase is required to reverse Black
Monday’s 22.6% decrease. Recent past stock market re-
turns may be more salient for novice investors. An investor
may look at the two most recent US bear markets and be
surprised by the required subsequent returns to break even.
The peak-to-trough fall from 2000-2003 of 43.7% required
a 77.5% return to break even, while the 2007-2009 fall
of 50.8% required a 103.4% return to break even (Shiller,
2016). A return sequence of +x% and –x% results in a neg-
ative overall return — it doesn’t matter which return comes
first — with the size of the negative overall return increas-
ing with the size of x (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2001). This
paper explores the causes and prevalence of the potentially
widespread misunderstanding of this aspect of downside fi-
nancial risk.
Personal investors will often interact with percentage in-
formation. For example, investors will often read rule-of-
thumb advice that a maximum tolerable loss for diversi-
fied stock market investments is around 50%, and that this
should be accounted for when setting allocation limits be-
tween stocks and safer assets such as bonds (Garrett, 2012;
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Swedroe & Balaban, 2012). But only investors who under-
stand the asymmetry between positive and negative percent-
age returns can rationally process this information. Many
investors are instead likely to assume that returns of +50%
and –50% cancel out. Investors may overestimate their risk
tolerance if they mistakenly underestimate the devastating
impact of large percentage losses. For example, novice par-
ticipants in the recent dot com and real estate investment
bubbles may have had their confidence bolstered by several
early years of large percentage gains, unaware of how eas-
ily a sequence of losses can reverse these gains. Although
this bias may be reduced in decisions from experience com-
pared to decisions from description (Hertwig, Barron, We-
ber & Erev, 2004), this can be an expensive lesson to learn
via experience.
A return sequence of +x% and –x% results in a negative
overall return, with overall losses increasing as x increases
(Bodie et al., 2001). While returns of +10% and –10% re-
sult in a total return of –1%, a return sequence of +50%
and –50% results in a total return of –25%. It is easiest
to understand the correct answer by simulating the value of
an investment over the two years. For returns of +/-10%,
an initial investment of $100 increases to $110 in year one,
before decreasing by $11 to $99. The second percentage
change multiplies both the initial value and the first percent-
age change. For returns of +/-50% a stock worth $100 in-
creases to $150, before falling to $75. I hypothesize that, in-
stead of performing this two-step multiplicative procedure,
many investors will perform a one-step additive procedure
and assume that returns of +x% and –x% = 0.
Research indicates that investors struggle to perform the
multiplication required in compound interest calculations,
involving annual percentage increases (Eisenstein & Hoch,
2007; McKenzie & Liersch, 2011). For example, an an-
nual growth of 10% over three years requires multiplying
1.1*1.1*1.1 by the initial account balance. These experi-
416
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 11, No. 5, September 2016 Downside financial risk is misunderstood 417
ments suggest that a number of participants perform a sim-
pler additive calculation, where the first year’s return is
added to the anticipated final balance for every year (e.g.,
1 + 0.1 + 0.1 + 0.1). When dealing with a sequence of pure
increases this leads to a systematic underestimation of the
final balance (Eisenstein & Hoch, 2007; McKenzie & Lier-
sch, 2011).
Prior consumer research suggests that percentages are
challenging generally, and not just in the financial domain
(Chen & Rao, 2007; Chen, Marmorstein, Tsiros & Rao,
2012; Kruger & Vargas, 2008). For example, Kruger and
Vargas (2008) find systematic framing effects between say-
ing product A is 50% more expensive than product B, com-
pared to saying that product B is 33% cheaper than product
A. (Imagine prices of $150 for product A and $100 for prod-
uct B.) Chen and Rao (2007) find that successive percentage
discounts or surcharges on consumer products are processed
additively, rather than multiplicatively.
Downside financial risk highlights the numerous inputs
to good financial decisions. Financial literacy is often-
investigated as a cause of poor financial behaviors (Mitchell
& Lusardi, 2011). But a recent meta-analysis of the litera-
ture suggests that financial literacy interventions have little
average effect on financial behaviors (Fernandes, Lynch &
Netemeyer, 2014). Downside financial risk is primarily a
numerical problem, however, and numeracy has been high-
lighted as another predictor of financial behaviors (Cokely
& Kelley, 2009; Cole, Paulson & Shastry, 2014; Estrada-
Mejia, de Vries & Zeelenberg, 2016; Ghazal, Cokely &
Garcia-Retamero, 2014). This paper explores associations
between the understanding of downside financial risk, finan-
cial literacy, and numeracy.
Five experiments are reported below to explore the (mis-
)understanding that a return of –x% more than wipes out
a return of +x%. I hypothesize that participants will most
commonly err by answering that this return sequence results
in a zero overall return (all Experiments). One important is-
sue is the extent to which this error is independent of return
size volatility, x (Experiments 1, 2, and 4). Experiment 3
tests the robustness of this effect to financial incentives. Po-
tentially relevant individual difference measures are inves-
tigated (Experiments 1 and 5). Finally, Experiments 4 and
5 test a debiasing intervention, and Experiment 5 tests po-
tential causal mechanisms through which this intervention
operates.
2 Experiment 1
2.1 Method
In all five experiments, participants aged 18 and over and
from the US were collected via Amazon Mechanical Turk,
and paid $.10. A total of 981 participants were recruited for
Experiment 1, to create a highly-powered initial study. For
this experiment, 53.3% of the sample had a college degree,
57.9% were female, and the average age was 36.4.
Return size volatility was manipulated within-
participants:
Suppose a stock increases 10% [50%] in year one,
decreases by 10% [50%] in year two, and does not
pay any dividends for the duration. Is the stock’s
final value more than, equal to, or less than its ini-
tial value?
In a counterbalanced design, half of participants an-
swered the +/-10% question at the start of the experiment,
and the +/-50% question at the end. The other half of partic-
ipants answered these questions in the opposite order. These
questions were put as far apart as possible to minimize recall
effects.
Other experimental measures were collected between
these two questions: demographic information of age, gen-
der, and education; financial literacy and numeracy scales
(which were potentially-relevant individual difference vari-
ables). The multiple-choice format of the Berlin numeracy
test (Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, Ghazal & Garcia-Retamero,
2012), and a 13-part financial literacy scale (Fernandes et
al., 2014) were selected as scales possessing good psycho-
metric features. The mean financial literacy score was 8.6
out of 13, while the mean numeracy score was 1.6 out of 4
(compared to mean scores of 7.3 out of 13 and 2.1 out of 4
reported in those two papers, respectively).
2.2 Results and discussion
Table 1 presents results of the downside risk questions.
The modal participant answered neither question correctly:
50.8% answered both downside risk questions incorrectly.
Just over a third of participants answered both downside risk
questions correctly (33.9%), while the remainder answered
one question correctly (15.3%).
Table 2 presents results of each individual question, bro-
ken down by percentage size and question order. The results
were stable: The percentage of correct responses ranged in a
narrow band, from 38.8% for +/-10% first, to 44.3% for +/-
50% last. For the first question of the survey, the modal re-
sponse was “equal to its initial value”, for both +/-10% and
+/-50% questions. The correct answer “less than its initial
value”, was the other most common response. Therefore, in
all the regression analyses that follow, multinomial logistic
regression was used to predict the likelihood of a response
shifting from “equal to” to “less than” its initial value.
A multinomial logistic regression was run to model the
factors predicting equal-to/less-than responses. Standard er-
rors were clustered per-participant because in this within-
participants design there were two observations of the de-
pendent variable per-participant. Table 3 shows the results.
Financial literacy and numeracy scales were standardized
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 11, No. 5, September 2016 Downside financial risk is misunderstood 418
Table 1: Overall percentage of correct responses to down-
side risk questions.
Number of questions
answered correctly
Percentage of participants
0 50.8%
1 15.3%
2 33.9%
Table 2: Responses to each downside risk question.
First Last
Response +/-10% +/-50% +/-10% +/-50%
More than its
initial value
14.6% 12.5% 13.5% 13.4%
Equal to its
initial value
43.9% 43.6% 38.9% 38.4%
Less than its
initial value
38.8% 41.3% 41.9% 44.3%
Don’t know 2.7% 2.6% 5.7% 3.9%
before being included in the regression. Both of these scales
were highly predictive of the correct response. Question
order was also significantly related to the correct response,
showing that participants had a slight tendency toward learn-
ing the correct response over the course of the experiment.
Return size volatility, however, was not significant, showing
that performance was identical across +/10% and +/-50%
questions. Gender was the only significant demographic
predictor of the correct response, with males on-average
scoring higher than females. Statistical significance of these
relationships was unchanged in a series of single predictor
regression models.
A mediational analysis was next performed to structurally
model the potentially causal pathways linking numeracy, fi-
nancial literacy and equal-to/less-than responses. The khb
command in Stata was used for performing mediation on a
multinomial logistic regression, which produces test statis-
tics based on the Sobel test (Kohler, Karlson &Holm, 2011).
Standard errors were again clustered per-participant. Finan-
cial literacy was found to partially mediate the link between
numeracy and task performance. Both the direct link be-
tween numeracy and task performance (z = 7.61, p < .001),
and the indirect link from numeracy via financial literacy to
task performance (z = 7.71, p < .001) were statistically sig-
nificant. The indirect link via financial literacy explained
31.2% of the total relationship between numeracy and task
performance. The mediational analysis reveals both direct
and indirect effects of numeracy on task performance. That
is, part of the reason numeracy predict overall performance
is because more numerate participants also tend to be more
financially literate. However, it must be noted that the ver-
sion of the Berlin numeracy task here showed some skew-
ness (mean response of 1.6 out of 4). The Berlin-Schwartz
numeracy scale has been shown to have better psychometric
properties in Mechanical Turk samples, and may have led to
different results (Cokely et al., 2012; see also Experiment 5
below and the general discussion).
The result showing that the proportion of equal-to/less-
than responses was unaffected by return size volatility mo-
tivated the design of Experiment 2. This was to explore the
robustness of this result to increasing return size volatility.
Recall that responding “equal to its initial value” overes-
timates the final portfolio value to an increasing degree as
return size volatility increases.
3 Experiment 2
Experiment 2 compared the +/-10% question with a more
extreme +/-100% question (where the -100% return makes
the investment worthless going forward).
3.1 Method
Another 287 participants were recruited (no participant took
part in more than one experiment), and assigned to one of
two conditions. Participants answered either the +/-10%
question from Experiment 1, or a manipulation featuring the
most extreme negative return possible (for a non-leveraged
investment):
Suppose a stock increases 100% in year one, de-
creases by 100% in year two, and does not pay
any dividends for the duration. Is the stock’s final
value more than, equal to, or less than its initial
value?
3.2 Results and discussion
Results are shown in Table 4. As can be seen, more peo-
ple answered correctly with the +/-100% return size. But
this is because a smaller percentage of participants an-
swered “more than its initial value” in the +/-100% con-
dition (2.8%) than in the +/-10% condition (17.4%). A
multinomial logistic regression showed that the shift from
responding “equal to its initial value”, to “less than its ini-
tial value” was almost significant (B = –0.51, z = –1.95, p
= .051, 95% CI [–1.01, 0.01]). However, the large differ-
ence in “more than its initial value” responses across the
two conditions conflicts with the independence of irrelevant
alternatives assumption of the multinomial logistic regres-
sion model. Therefore, a binary logistic regression model
was also run, and showed that the proportion of “equal to its
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Table 3: Multinomial logistic regression estimates from Experiment 1, comparing equal-to/less-than responses. Positive
values correspond to a higher probability of responding “less than its initial value”.
Variables Estimate z p 95% Confidence Interval
Financial literacy 0.68 7.04 <.001 [0.49, 0.87]
Numeracy 0.54 7.24 <.001 [0.39, 0.69]
Question order 0.21 3.30 0.001 [0.09, 0.34]
Return size 0.10 1.57 0.117 [–0.03, 0.23]
Age –0.01 –0.92 0.355 [–0.02, 0.01]
Education
High school graduate –1.19 –1.80 0.072 [–2.48, 0.11]
Some college –0.49 –0.77 0.440 [–1.74, 0.76]
College graduate –0.01 –0.01 0.994 [–1.26, 1.25]
Gender –0.45 –2.94 0.003 [–0.74, –0.15]
Note: Baseline levels were the first question for question order, +/-10%
for return size, some high school for education, and male for gender.
Table 4: Results of experiment 2.
Response +/-10% +/-100%
More than its initial value 17.4% 2.8%
Equal to its initial value 43.1% 40.6%
Less than its initial value 34.0% 53.2%
Don’t know 5.6% 3.5%
initial value” responses did not differ significantly between
the two conditions (B = 0.10, z = 0.43, p = .688, 95% CI
[–0.37, 0.57]).
Although participants were more accurate in the +/-100%
condition, this increase in accuracy did not come from a de-
crease in “equal to its initial value” responses. If the magni-
tude of overestimation is considered as an outcome measure,
then participants actually performed worse in the +/-100%
condition (overestimating final value by 100%) than in the
+/-10% condition (overestimating by 1%).
While these are interesting results to hypothetical ques-
tions, real world decisions will have (often large) financial
incentives. Therefore, the robustness of the effect to finan-
cial incentives motivated the design of Experiment 3.
4 Experiment 3
4.1 Method
Another 277 participants were recruited and assigned to one
of two conditions. In a between-participants design, partic-
ipants answered the +/-10% question, either as-before with
Table 5: Results of experiment 3.
Response no incentive incentive
More than its initial value 20.3% 11.9%
Equal to its initial value 35.7% 37.3%
Less than its initial value 40.6% 48.5%
Don’t know 3.5% 2.2%
only a $0.10 baseline fee, or with an additional $0.10 in-
centive (giving participants the chance to earn $0.20 in total
with a correct answer). Although this is not a high abso-
lute level of financial incentives, it is a high relative level
of incentive. Participants in the incentive condition saw the
message, “Answer this question correctly and earn a $0.10
bonus!” immediately above the downside risk question text.
All bonuses were credited within 24 hours.
4.2 Results and discussion
Results of Experiment 3 are in Table 5. The two conditions
had very similar frequencies of “equal to its initial value”
responses: 35.7% with no incentive, and 37.3% with in-
centives. A multinomial logistic regression showed that the
financial incentive did not induce a statistically significant
shift between equal-to/less-than responses (B = 0.13, z =
0.50, p = .619, 95% CI [–0.39, 0.66]). The only effect of
financial incentives was a decrease in the least-common re-
sponse “more than its initial value”, from 20.3% to 11.9%,
with most of these participants now moving toward the cor-
rect answer. This difference may also be problematic for the
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Table 6: Responses to each downside risk question.
+/-10% +/-50%
Response
no
debiasing
debiasing
prompt
no
debiasing
debiasing
prompt
More than its
initial value
18.9% 11.6% 15.2% 10.7%
Equal to its
initial value
45.3% 41.0% 44.0% 32.5%
Less than its
initial value
30.7% 46.2% 36.6% 54.8%
Don’t know 5.1% 1.2% 4.3% 2.0%
independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption for the
multinomial logistic regression model. Therefore, a binary
logistic regression was also run, which also failed to detect
any significant difference in “equal to its initial value” re-
sponses across the two groups (B = 0.07, z = 0.28, p = .776,
95% CI [–0.42, 0.56]).
Experiment 3 bears two similarities with Experiment 2.
In both experiments, a manipulation increased the percent-
age of correct responses, but without reducing the frequency
of “equal to its initial value” responses. Both of these exper-
iments provide evidence for at least one extra pattern of mis-
takes, which leads to a minority of participants responding
“more than its initial value”, in the baseline condition, but
which is then substantially reduced with the +/-100% ques-
tion or financial incentives. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to investigate why this might be the case or whether
these results are robust, but a greater understanding of the
heterogeneity of mistakes in this task may help improve the
understanding of underlying psychological factors. How-
ever, “equal to its initial value” is in both experiments the
modal incorrect response, and the frequency of this incorrect
response was unaffected by the experimental manipulations.
This result suggests that this is the most frequent and robust
incorrect response to downside financial risk.
5 Experiment 4
Experiment 4 was designed to explore the extent to which
participants can be debiased and potential mechanisms that
help participants avoid the “equal to its initial value” re-
sponse. Recall that calculating the correct response requires
holding the year one value in memory before calculating the
impact of the second percentage change. Therefore, a debi-
asing prompt was included as a new experimental condition
to try and promote more accurate evaluation of downside
financial risk.
5.1 Method
A total of 1,014 participants were recruited. A 2x2 between-
participants design was used, manipulating return size
volatility (+/-10%, +/-50%) and debiasing prompt (no debi-
asing, debiasing prompt). Experimental materials were the
same as before, with the following prompt added in the de-
biasing conditions after the first sentence of description:
When answering, try to imagine what would hap-
pen to a $100 initial investment over the two
years. Think about the investment’s value after
year one, and then its value after year two.
This is a direct prompt for participants to perform the ad-
ditional step of mental calculation required to generate the
correct answer.
5.2 Results and discussion
Results of Experiment 4 are in Table 6. As can be seen,
“equal to its initial value” is the modal response with no
debiasing prompt, for both return size conditions. Inclusion
of a debiasing prompt improves responses, and “less than its
initial value” becomes the modal response.
A multinomial logistic regression, with independent vari-
ables of return size volatility and debiasing prompt was
run. Regression coefficients comparing equal-to/less-than
responses revealed the following. The debiasing prompt was
effective (B = 0.60, z = 4.30, p < .001, 95% CI [0.33, 0.88]).
Participants were also slightly more accurate in the +/-50%
condition than the +/-10% condition (B = –0.30, z = –2.14,
p = .032, 95% CI [–0.57, –0.02]).
Although substantial error-rates remained, the debiasing
prompt improved evaluation and judgment. There was in
this experiment also a small effect of return size volatility,
with participants being more accurate in the +/-50% condi-
tion. However, this effect was not large enough to correct for
the greater magnitude of overestimation (responding “equal
to its initial value” overestimates the final value by 1% in
the +/-10% condition but by 25% in the +/-50% condition).
6 Experiment 5
Experiment 5 was designed to test the robustness of the pre-
vious experiments. In Experiment 5 an alternative question
wording was used, and participants were asked about the
presence of household investments. Response time, finan-
cial literacy, and the Berlin-Schwartz numeracy scale were
further collected to investigate factors underlying the mis-
understanding of downside financial risk.
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Table 7: Responses across debiasing prompt and presence
of household investments.
no debiasing debiasing prompt
Response
no invest-
ments
invest-
ments
no invest-
ments
invest-
ments
More than its
initial value
17.9% 21.1% 18.0% 15.0%
Equal to its
initial value
39.6% 28.2% 31.4% 26.4%
Less than its
initial value
37.2% 48.2% 47.4% 56.3%
Don’t know 5.3% 2.5% 3.1%% 2.4%
6.1 Method
A further 939 participants were collected from Amazon Me-
chanical Turk. Participants had a mean financial literacy
score of 8.3 out of 13 (Fernandes et al., 2014) and a mean
Berlin-Schwartz numeracy score of 3.0 out of 7 (Cokely et
al., 2012). More than half of the sample, 57.3%, reported
some level of household investments by responding yes to
the question, “Do you, or does anyone else in your house-
hold, own any stocks, bonds, or mutual funds in an invest-
ment account, or in a self-directed IRA or 401(k) retirement
account?”.
One goal of Experiment 5 was to see if the results of
the previous experiments were robust to an alternative ques-
tion wording. The following question wording was used to
clarify that the second percentage change refers to the year
1 price by using the phrase “decreases by 10% of its new
price”:
Suppose a stock increases 10% in year one, de-
creases by 10% of its new price in year two, and
does not pay any dividends for the duration. Is the
stock’s final value more than, equal to, or less than
its initial value?
Participants either answered this question, or a version of
this question including the debiasing prompt from Exper-
iment 4. Therefore, this was a two-condition between-
participants experiment. Total response time was recorded
for this question. Participants took on average 35.6 seconds
on this question before continuing to the rest of the survey,
which involved demographic, financial literacy, and numer-
acy blocks presented in randomized order.
6.2 Results and discussion
Table 7 shows that, “equal to its initial value” was the modal
response for non-investors who did not receive the debias-
ing prompt. The correct “less than its initial value” was the
modal response for the three other groups. However, in all
cases over a quarter of responses were for “equal to its ini-
tial value”. A multinomial logistic regression showed that
both debiasing prompt (B = 0.34, z = 2.23, p = .026, 95%
CI [0.04, 0.64]) and the presence of household investments
(B = 0.48, z = 3.16, p = .002, 95% CI [0.18, 0.78]) led to
significant shifts from equal-to to less-than responses.
A multinomial logistic regression was next run to inves-
tigate the associations between equal-to/less-than responses
and financial literacy, numeracy, and response time. These
variables were first standardized before being added to the
previous regression. There was a statistically significant
positive link between all three of these variables and equal-
to/less-than responses. The link with numeracy was the
largest (B = 0.92, z = 8.86, p < .001, 95% CI [0.72, 1.12]),
while links with financial literacy (B = 0.55, z = 5.48, p <
.001, 95% CI [0.35, 0.74]), and response time were equal (B
= 0.52, z = 4.06, p < .001, 95% CI [0.27, 0.77]). Numeracy
had the strongest positive link with accurate performance,
although all three effects were positive. Statistical signif-
icance of these relationships was unchanged in a series of
single predictor regression models.
Potential mediational relationships were next tested using
the khb command for mediation in non-linear probability
models in Stata (Kohler et al., 2011). In all cases the shift
from equal to- to less than- responses was assessed using
a multinomial logistic regression. Consistent with results
from Experiment 1, financial literacy was again found to
partially mediate the link between numeracy and task per-
formance. The model indicated that both the direct link be-
tween numeracy and task performance (z = 8.72, p < .001),
and the indirect link from numeracy via financial literacy to
task performance (z = 5.40, p < .001) were statistically sig-
nificant. The indirect link via financial literacy explained
20.1% of the total relationship between numeracy and task
performance, similar to that observed in Experiment 1 (i.e.,
20.1% vs. 31.2%).
Next, potential mediational relationships between the de-
biasing prompt and financial literacy, numeracy, and re-
sponse time on equal-to/less-than responses were tested.
Neither financial literacy (z = 0.77, p = .444) nor numer-
acy (z = 1.53, p = .126) mediated the link between debiasing
prompt and task performance. However, response time did
fully mediate the link between debiasing prompt and equal-
to/less-than responses: The indirect effect was significant (z
= 2.97, p = .003) and the direct effect was no longer signif-
icant (z = 1.32, p = .188). Finally, I modeled the extent to
which response time mediated the links between financial
literacy and numeracy and equal to-/less than- responses.
Across the sample as a whole, response time failed to medi-
ate either financial literacy (z = 0.50, p = .617) or numeracy
(z = 0.04, p = .976).
Experiment 5 has two main findings. First, many peo-
ple including those who manage household investments ex-
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Table 8: Results of two replication studies, using the original
question wording (Prolific Academic) and the new question
wording from Experiment 5 (Mechanical Turk).
Prolific Academic Mechanical Turk
Response +/-10% +/-50% +/-10% +/-50%
More than its
initial value
15.8% 17.1% 21.5% 17.1%
Equal to its
initial value
30.1% 26.0% 31.3% 40.7%
Less than its
initial value
47.3% 52.7% 43.1% 41.4%
Don’t know 6.9% 4.1% 4.2% 0.7%
pressed the same robust pattern of errors found in Experi-
ments 1–4. However, this pattern was substantially reduced,
but not eliminated, by a variation in question wording that
encouraged participants to process the numerical informa-
tion more carefully and deliberately. This result helps sup-
port the external validity of these findings. Second, finan-
cial literacy, numeracy, and response time all contributed to
the shift from equal-to to less-than responses. Interestingly,
the effect of the debiasing prompt was fully mediated by re-
sponse time, indicating that the debiasing prompt worked by
prompting greater deliberation.
These results may continue to hold for investors in gen-
eral. Newall and Love (2015) found a similar pattern of re-
sults with a question based on losses of +/-10%, after screen-
ing out Mechanical Turk participants without any house-
hold investments. Two further experiments were also con-
ducted to establish the generality of these results. An ex-
periment with 292 participants aged 18 and over from the
US was run on Prolific Academic, another crowdsourcing
website. Return size volatility was manipulated between-
participants (+/-10%, +/-50%), using the original question
wording. And another identical experiment was run on 284
participants from Mechanical Turk, using Experiment 5’s
question wording. Results of these two experiments are in
Table 8. Multinomial logistic regression showed that return
size volatility did not lead to a significant shift in equal-
to/less-than responses in either the Prolific Academic exper-
iment (B = 0.26, z = 0.93, p = .354, 95% CI [–0.29, 0.80])
or the Mechanical Turk experiment (B = –0.30, z = –1.12, p
= .262, 95% CI [–0.83, 0.23]).
7 General discussion
These results show that downside financial risk is commonly
misunderstood. The most frequent and robust error in these
experiments is consistent with participants adding the ef-
fect of the two percentage changes, when these results of
changes (expressed as proportions) should normatively be
multiplied. This error is consistent with the strategies peo-
ple seem to use underlying exponential growth bias, where
sequences of percentage gains are underestimated (Eisen-
stein & Hoch, 2007; McKenzie & Liersch, 2011). This error
is also consistent with the mistakes consumers make when
evaluating percentage discounts or surcharges (Chen & Rao,
2007; Kruger & Vargas, 2008).
These results have implications for the communication of
downside risk to diverse investors and others charged with
communicating and managing financial products. Stock
market losses are commonly communicated as percentages
normalized over different starting values. For example, the
daily news report may say that the Dow Jones Industrial Av-
erage has declined 2% over the last day and 10% over the
last month – percentage movements normalized over differ-
ent starting values, as in the experiments reported in this
paper. These results suggest that percentage changes should
if possible be communicated in a different way. Reporting
a series of percentage changes as a single aggregate change
– performing the necessary multiplication – should improve
understanding (i.e., reporting yearly returns of +10% and –
10% as a two-yearly return of –1%).
These results show that investors’ intuitions about down-
side financial risk are most inaccurate for large percentage
decreases. The US stock market has fallen by around 50%
twice since the turn of the century (Shiller, 2016). Per-
sonal investment guides often warn investors to prepare for
maximum losses of around this magnitude with diversified
stock market investments (Garrett, 2012; Swedroe & Bala-
ban, 2012). Many investors may unwittingly overestimate
the risk tolerance if they do not correctly understand that
such losses can take a long time to recover from, given his-
torical after-inflation stock market returns of around 6–7%
a year (Dimson, Marsh & Staunton, 2009). It takes a subse-
quent 100% return to recover from a 50% loss.
These results also shed light on potential drivers of the
misunderstanding of downside risk, and the extent to which
it can be debiased. Poor financial literacy has been much-
studied as a potential cause of poor financial behavior
(Mitchell & Lusardi, 2011). But other authors argue that di-
rectly increasing financial literacy has had little positive ef-
fect on financial behavior, and that positive correlations be-
tween literacy and behavior reflects omitted variables (Fer-
nandes et al., 2014). Numeracy has been highlighted as an-
other potential driver of poor financial behaviors (Cokely
& Kelley., 2009; Cole et al., 2014; Estrada-Mejia et al.,
2016; Ghazal et al., 2014). In Experiment 1 financial lit-
eracy and numeracy were approximately equally associated
with task performance. Experiment 5 used a more sensi-
tive measure of numeracy for the given participant pool, and
found that numeracy was then a better predictor of task per-
formance than financial literacy. (It should be noted that
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these designs were correlational in nature and thus caution is
merited when evaluating causal claims.) Nevertheless, both
constructs were robust predictors of task performance, and
in both experiments financial literacy partially mediated the
link between numeracy and task performance. It could be
that some knowledge of financial concepts is needed to ac-
curately apply numerical reasoning to financial problems,
such as the understanding of downside financial risk.
Theoretically, financial literacy and numeracy are both
important in the understanding of downside financial risk,
and both may be relatively hard to improve. A simple de-
biasing prompt improved responses in Experiments 4 and 5.
Response time data in Experiment 5 showed that this debi-
asing prompt was fully mediated by response time, showing
that its effect occurred from inducing greater deliberation
(Cokely & Kelley, 2009). Prompting greater deliberation
should be further investigated as a potentially cost-effective
method of improving financial decisions.
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